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Perceptions about the WTO trade institutions
    .        *
Georgetown University Law Centre

Abstract : This article, based on a lecture given at the inauguration ceremony for the
new Advisory Centre on WTO Law, describes the broader world trading landscape
into which this new Centre emerges. Taking into account the possible implications
of the events on September 11, this article provides a brief analysis of the current
trade policy climate, asserting the necessity of institutions for the successful
functioning of markets. After a short institutional history of the GATT}WTO, the
author describes the importance of institutional rules, treaty text, and practice for
the success of the WTO and presents the current debate over what the scope of this
institution has been, is now, and could be in the future – the debate over which
important issues should be taken under the WTO umbrella, and, further, which
issues are appropriate to send to the Dispute Settlement System. Finally, this article
illustrates the challenges facing this dispute settlement system, proposals for reform,
and the vital role that the new Advisory Centre may be able to play in resolving
some of these challenges.

The ceremony for the inauguration of the newly formed Advisory Centre on WTO
Law, which will fulfill a vitally needed role for giving assistance to developing
countries in their activities in the WTO dispute settlement system, is an appropriate
context for me to address some of the broader issues of the WTO, and to situate the
beginning of this new Advisory Centre in that broader context." It is my intention to
do this task in four major parts. First I will discuss the broader policy ‘ landscape ’ in
which the trade system is situated today, recognizing that the events of 11 September
in New York City and Washington DC are having an extraordinarily profound
impact, but not focusing solely on that feature.
Secondly, in section 2, I will discuss the WTO as an institution and the importance
of the institutional rules, treaty text, and practice for the success of the WTO and
other organizations related to it. In this part, I will focus primarily on the nondispute settlement features of the organization, namely the diplomatic and

* Correspondence : University Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Centre, 600 New Jersey Avenue,
NW, Washington DC 20001, USA.
1 This article is adapted from my keynote lecture delivered at the ceremony for the inauguration of the
Advisory Centre on WTO Law, held in Geneva at the WTO, on 5 October 2001. The talk was delivered from
rough notes, and was not recorded, so this article is partially a reconstruction as well as a subsequent editing
and abridgement of that talk.
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negotiating contexts that make various decisions and are creating rules or rule
changes.
In section 3, I will turn to the dispute settlement system, looking at its institutional
role in the context of the broader ‘ constitution ’. And, finally, in section 4, I will turn
to the new Advisory Centre, and its significance in this broader context.

1.

The current policy landscape of the WTO trading system

1.1 The meaning of 11 September and after
It is not possible to avoid the implications of what happened in New York City and
Washington DC on 11 September.
In the United States, virtually every citizen knows the date of 7 December 1941.
On that date, Pearl Harbor was attacked without warning by a foreign government’s
military power, and it resulted in the United States essentially losing a major Navy
Fleet. Approximately 2,400 persons (virtually all military personnel) died in that
attack.
On 11 September 2001, in New York City, several terrorist-hijacked airplanes
attacked a symbol of western democratic institutions – the World Trade Centre – in
the heart of the New York trade and financial center. Over 3,000 persons
(virtually all non-military) lost their lives in this attack (and in another attack in
Washington DC) and the World Trade Centre itself was destroyed, inflicting
potentially severe damage on the entire world economy.
Thus, we can make some comparisons between these events, and it would not be
folly to come to the judgment that the more recent event was several times more
severe and disastrous than the previous one mentioned. Already we are seeing a
variety of commentary and discussion about the impact of the September events. For
example, there are those who say that this is the end of globalization, although there
are other comments that oppose that. Among other things, we have seen major
economic sectors, such as travel (particularly air travel) and tourism, plummet,
resulting in more than 100,000 job losses in airlines, and potentially many hundreds
of thousands losing their jobs in the tourism industry. Tourism constitutes 10 per
cent of the US economy, and apparently employs one million persons in Europe
alone.
Businesses will clearly be changing their practices. There is already a trend to limit
business travel, and to rethink the global procurement ideas that had become such
a part of the globalizing economy. The events of September suggest a whole new
layer of risks on business activity, and thus a higher risk premium is considered
necessary for an appropriate rate of return ; therefore the capital value of investments
decline. Other activities, such as the economics of skyscrapers and transportation,
are being re-thought. We have seen the immediate response of huge public
expenditures, and a shift in the budget priorities of major nations, obviously
including the nation that was attacked, the United States.
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In responding to these challenges, governments may find it necessary, and are
certainly tempted, to constrain certain types of liberties that had been taken for
granted, including some liberties that are essential to the working of markets (such
as freedom of information and freedom of movement of individuals in relation to
their business needs). We are also seeing a considerable nervousness about other
events in the world : a factory blowing up in Toulouse France, and a Russian plane
that is somehow blasted out of the sky over the Black Sea. These may be relatively
normal accidents, but there is the tendency to wonder whether they might be part of
a broader pattern of terrorist activity.
Perhaps one of the few bright spots in this landscape is that it seems to have
created an international relations atmosphere that demands greater international
cooperation. Perhaps, some might say, this is a wake up call to nations that might
otherwise be tempted to indulge in unilateral measures without consideration of
impacts on foreign societies. Of course it remains to be seen how long this new
attitude toward international cooperation will persist. The other side of that coin is
the utilization by special interests of the ‘ excuse of terrorism ’ to obtain special
government funding allotments and to pursue other objectives that long preceded the
September events, but now are rationalized as more important because of the need
to counter terrorism.
Indeed, some of these activities seem to be profoundly affecting basic market
economics principles, with the surge in government spending leading some to rethink
the advantages of reliance on market and non-government institutions in society. In
terms of trade policy, the whole idea of ‘ subsidies ’ may need to be rethought, as well
as other principles of the world trade system.

1.2 Importance of institutions for markets
Economists generally, and more particularly Nobel Prize winning economists over
the past decades,# have often stressed the importance of institutions in the
functioning of markets. Without an institutional framework, markets simply will
not work. This framework can be comprised of various types of human institutions,
such as practice, culture, particular bidding structures, etc. But legal rules are the
most prominent of the institutional frameworks for markets. Thus, since legal rules
almost always require governments, governments become central to markets
(contrary to some statements by ideologically oriented persons who think less
government is always better).
The previous most important innovation of institutions regarding international
economic relations was the development of the Bretton Woods institutions, starting
with the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, and running through to the end of the
1940s. The 1944 Conference created the World Bank and the International Monetary
2 See North, D. C., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press, 1990 ; Coase, R. H., The Firm, the Market, and the Law, Chicago : University of Chicago
Press, 1998.
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Fund, and the negotiations for a similar organization for trade (the third leg of the
tripod of Bretton Woods institutions) continued through 1948. But as is commonly
known, the potential International Trade Organization, or ITO (of the Havana
Charter of March 1948) never came into effect, largely because of objections in the
US Congress. However, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
in place for some very special diplomatic and national constitutional reasons
(particularly the structure of the United States Constitution and its authorities
delegated to the President). The GATT continued, therefore, to play a role that
gradually became enhanced, as it filled the vacuum left by the failure of a trade
organization to come into being. This role became increasingly important as decades
wore on, but it also became clear, with the passage of time, that the GATT had
substantial institutional defects$ that made it harder and harder for it to cope with
some of the new issues being thrust upon it.
Thus, in the Uruguay Round, which added several huge new subjects to the trade
system competence (especially intellectual property and services), it was considered
necessary to create a new organization, the WTO. All of this is familiar ground. One
of the lessons of this is the important contribution that was made by the institutional
fathers of the Bretton Woods system (including all three legs of the stool). The basic
objective of these persons was to prevent another world war of the catastrophic
nature of World War II. In that respect, the system can claim a considerable amount
of success. Clearly, the institutions created have contributed to the prevention of a
cataclysmic World War III. But one of the key questions is whether those institutions
are still appropriate to the kinds of problems that are being faced by the world today,
including financial crises, tendencies towards partitioning markets, both by nation
state protectionism and excessive regionalism, and, of course, the operation of
terrorism, and how that affects market institutions.

1.3 Institutional philosophy
At this point, I would like to turn for assistance to some outstanding academics and
their writings. In particular, I would like to broaden the context of this paper, to look
at some of the thinking about the institutions that are critical for international
markets.
In particular, I refer to an extraordinary lecture delivered by Professor Robert
Keohane, of Duke University, who was the President of the American Political
Science Association for the year 2000. In that capacity, he delivered the annual
Presidential lecture, which is a careful, long, thoughtful, and I must add, very dense

3 See, for example, Jackson, J. H., The World Trading System : Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations, 2nd edn, Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1997 ; Jackson, J. H., The Jurisprudence of the GATT and
the WTO : Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000 ;
Jackson, J. H., The World Trade Organization : Constitution and Jurisprudence, Chatham House Papers,
London : Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998.
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speech.% I cannot possibly discuss very much of this lecture, although I commend it
to persons who would like an extraordinarily thorough overview of political science
with regard to this subject, but I think there are two key points that need to be
considered. One is a list that Professor Keohane puts forward of prerequisites for
successful social institutions. Second, is the importance of norms, or rules, as part of
the institutional structure for enhancing the potential success of markets.
(i) Prerequisites for successful social institutions
Professor Keohane outlines a series of prerequisites for social institutions, relying in
part on other thinkers, such as Jurgen Habermas.& From Habermas, Keohane notes
the importance of ‘ discourse ’, generally meaning very wide participation with open
communication and ‘ collective reflection ’. These elements of an institution, he and
other profound thinkers suggest, are exceedingly important to the durability and
success of social institutions in the kind of world that we are living in today (with
extremely broad and fast communication, and a relatively high world-wide level of
education). He outlines considerable detail about this, but for our purposes, I
mention three procedural criteria that he sets forth :
First, he stresses the importance of accountability and recognizes that this may
lead to ideas of government being close to its constituents, or what is sometimes
termed ‘ subsidiarity ’.
Second, he notes the importance of participation that is open to all, particularly
in the process of rule-formulation, but maybe also in the process of rule-application.
Thirdly, he notes the importance of persuasion in a thoughtful and non-polemic
way. He notes that there is a necessity for institutionalized procedures to ensure that
this type of persuasion can have its important impacts.
(ii) The importance of rules or norms
The second major category that many thinkers (including Professor Keohane) stress
is the importance of rules or norms. These rules have considerable importance to
markets, particularly markets that are based on decentralized decision-making of
private enterprises, which number in the millions. As I myself have written, these
market participants find it more efficient to have a certain degree of predictability
and stability,' which rules can provide, and thus reduce somewhat the risk of their
entrepreneurial decisions. Keohane and the thinkers that he relies on note that the
rules should have certain characteristics, such as hindering manipulation, allowing
third-party discourse, providing for precedents – and thus predictability, stability,
and being created through impartial processes.
4 Keohane, R., ‘ Governance in a partially globalized world ’, Presidential address, American Political
Science Association, 2000, The American Political Science Review, March 2001.
5 Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms : Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,
Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1996.
6 See supra note 3.
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2.

The WTO as an institution for the enhancement of world market activity

There has been much discussion recently about the appropriate scope of WTO
activity, or the dimensions of its ‘ competence ’. Occasionally, people have said that
the WTO has become overloaded and threatens to be further overloaded, and these
persons (ignoring the fact that overloading is mostly a function of lack of government
will to provide the necessary resources) sometimes advocate that the WTO return to
its ‘ central responsibility, which had been confined to border measures that limited
trade ’. This view is a serious misunderstanding of the history of the GATT.
From the very beginning, the GATT text provided great attention to internal
government measures affecting trade, as well as border measures. Article III
paragraph 4 is an extraordinarily broad and sweeping clause, requiring nondiscriminatory treatment (‘ National Treatment ’) in the application of virtually all
types of internal economic regulation, as affecting imports. In the early decades of
the GATT, most negotiating attention was upon tariff reduction, and this process
was extraordinarily successful. But by the 1970s, it had become clear that tariffs were
no longer the really important policy issues for trade liberalization. There had been
a substantial shift to ‘ non-tariff barriers ’ (NTBs), partly as an alternative to low
tariffs sought by constituencies in order to limit competition, and thus give them
greater shares of the producer surplus.
Therefore, it became clear that attention toward internal government measures
would have to be increased. Thus in the Tokyo Round a great deal more than usual
attention was put upon non-tariff barrier measures, resulting in a series of side codes
(partly because of the difficulty of amending the GATT) that addressed a variety of
such non-tariff measures, including subsidies, customs valuation, product standards,
government procurement, etc. Likewise, the Uruguay Round went considerably
further in this regard, pulling together almost all of these side codes into a ‘ single
package ’ becoming mandatory on all Members of the WTO. This surely has been a
very major step in the right direction of providing the necessary institutional
framework for markets to work. But it has not been without pain. Such attention to
the internal regulatory activities of governments has brought its share of backlash.
It has also induced some advocates, some of whom are clearly motivated by the
desire to prevent competition and market forces from operating to their short-term
detriment, to object to further addition of subject matters underneath the WTO
umbrella.
There may indeed be arguments why certain additional subjects should not be
brought under the WTO umbrella, but those arguments are not reasonably based on
some a priori notion that the GATT}WTO has certain ‘ inherent limitations ’ to its
appropriate competence. In fact, when you read the GATT and other Uruguay
Round texts, including Article III, and when you consider the way the world’s
‘ globalized economy ’ has been developing, it becomes reasonably clear that virtually
every economic regulatory subject regarding activity and economic influences that
cross nation state borders (and virtually all do) could logically be included in the
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WTO reach. There needs to be some kind of international cooperative institutional
mechanism to address these regulatory problems in a way that nation states are
increasingly unable to do successfully. Thus, logically, subjects such as competition
policy, investment rules, labor standards, environmental standards, etc. could be
subjects for the WTO competence.
But there are also reasons not to bring such subjects under the WTO umbrella ;
reasons that are not based on an a priori rigid, taxonomic view of the WTO
institution, but rely more on a pragmatic consideration of the resources and
competence available in the WTO as an organization and the limitations on those
resources, as well as ideas about whether the ‘ inside the Geneva beltway ’ mindset is
capable, at least in the near term, of addressing some of the more complex, and
possibly ambiguous, policies involved. In addition, of course, some of the subject
matters, if brought into the WTO tent, could be utilized in a way that has little to do
with the basic purposes of liberalizing trade while balancing other social policies. In
short, there is a danger of the misuse of some of these subjects for protectionist
reasons.
Indeed, some rethinking could be important for the questions of ‘ single package ’
and ‘ most-favored nation ’. There are some issues that increasingly need to be
addressed by an international institution of some sort, but there is little pragmatic
reason to require all 142WTO Members to embrace rules for those subjects.
Maybe half the nations would provide more than 90 per cent of the market activity
relating to those subjects, and that half of the Membership would provide an
important critical mass for a core group for addressing some issues (as exemplified
by telecommunications and financial services). Maybe competition policy, investment, and the environment are other issues ripe for such consideration, and
maybe some rethinking is necessary for the intellectual property area. All of these are
conjectures, and it is also the case that it may be necessary, particularly in the face
of a too-rigid consensus approach to decision making, or because of the risks of
misuse of WTO power in certain circumstances, to go elsewhere to some other kinds
of institutions, maybe some of which might be loosely affiliated with the WTO. In
any event, there are many different kinds of institutional structures that could be
considered, and attention to these broader, systemic issues of the world trading
system is vitally needed.
Much of the above also relates to the question of ‘ sovereignty ’, which is a concept
that is certainly much abused. Indeed, this concept has been characterized as
‘ organized hypocrisy ’ by an outstanding academic who has written extensively on
this subject.( Often, sovereignty is invoked for special interest-pleading that has very
little to do with the true issues of institutional structure for international economic
relations. Basically, it is my view that the real issue of ‘ sovereignty ’ is the question
of allocation of decision-making authority. It is the question of whether a certain
kind of decision should be made in Geneva, Washington DC, Sacramento, or
7 Krasner, S. D., Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1999.
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Berkeley (or in the European context : in Geneva, Brussels, Berlin, at the LaX nder
(state) level, or finally at the city level). This is a subject for other discussions and
writings,) but it is important to recognize that it is vitally intertwined with the
question of institutional development of the WTO.
At this point, it is necessary to turn to the WTO dispute settlement system.

3.

The WTO dispute settlement system

One of the more admired attributes of the GATT was its dispute settlement system
and accompanying procedures. The original text of the GATT included very little
about dispute settlement, but over more than 30 years of experience and trial and
error, the GATT dispute settlement procedures developed into a remarkably
sophisticated and quite effective system, which helped create a sense of implementation of the results of the findings of that system.*
The new WTO dispute settlement system, essentially established in the ‘ Dispute
Settlement Understanding ’ (which is Annex 2 of the WTO Charter"!) is a further
progression of the GATT system towards ‘ rule orientation ’."" As indicated in Part
I of this article, many thinkers about human institutions, especially as they relate to
markets, realize the values of a rule orientation system. These values include :
1 A sense of fairness that the players or participants in the system can expect to be
treated even-handedly, and relatively impartially, so that they will be operating
on a ‘ level playing field ’ of trade policy. Thus, developing and least-developed
countries have a chance for some redress of grievances that result from countries
(even large, developed countries) departing wrongfully from the rules. Especially
in an era of globalization and terrorist peril, such a sense of fairness is significant,
partly as an antidote to ‘ pure power exercise ’, or what has been termed ‘ poweroriented diplomacy ’ rather than rule-oriented diplomacy.
2 A second value recognized by many perceptive thinkers is that a rule-oriented
system tends to reduce, at least moderately, the risks that entrepreneurs take and
gives those entrepreneurs a higher degree of security, stability, and predictability.

8 See Jackson, J. H., ‘ The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate : United States Acceptance and Implementation
of the Uruguay Round Results ’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 36 (1997) : 157–188 and Jackson,
J. H., ‘ Sovereignty, Subsidiarity, and the Separation of Powers : The High Wire Balancing Act of
Globalization ’, Conference Proceedings, University of Minnesota Law School, Conference to Honor Professor
R. E. Hudec, September 2000 ; Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
9 See Jackson, J. H., The World Trading System : Law and Policy of International Economic Relations,
2nd edn, Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1997, chapter 4 ; Hudec, R. E., Enforcing International Trade Law : The
Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System, Salem, N.H. : Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1993.
10 The phrase ‘ WTO Charter ’ refers to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
11 See, for example, Jackson, The World Trading System, p. 109 ; Jackson, J. H., The World Trade
Organization : Constitution and Jurisprudence, Chatham House Papers. London : Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1998, chapter 4.
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Another way of expressing this is that such a system reduces the ‘ risk premium ’
of a variety of economic decisions, including investment decisions. A reduction
in the risk premium means that the risk taker can accept a somewhat lower
return on his investment or other decision, and in the aggregate, when this is a
situation generally prevailing, this reduction in the risk premium is a reduction
in transaction costs as well. Altogether, these factors would normally represent
a substantial increase in the efficiency of economic activity, and thus, an increase
in world welfare.
3 However, the dispute settlement system faces a degree of unease from many of
the ‘ old hands ’ and experienced participants. It is clear that an effective dispute
settlement system has certain impacts on ‘ sovereignty ’. Nation states find
themselves constrained as to what they may want to do with respect to their
internal policies, because certain measures may be inconsistent with the
international rules, and a dispute settlement system can so declare, making it
much more difficult for an errant nation state to take such inconsistent measures.
Yet, clearly there is a benefit to be obtained, as mentioned above, which can be
considerably greater than the small inroads on sovereignty.

As businesses begin to accept the effectiveness of a rule-oriented system, and begin
to take account of it in their strategic planning, it generally seems that such
businesses see a value in the system, even though they may feel that they have less
opportunity to affect their own nation’s activities. The rules and the method of
implementing rules (such as a dispute settlement system) also have an impact on
citizens, and this impact is growing as more and more issues of internal government
regulation fall under the umbrella of the WTO system.
So far, the reform of the dispute settlement system represented by the new
procedures of the WTO and the Uruguay Round text appear to be extraordinarily
successful. As this is written, in November 2001, there have been, in the period of the
WTO’s existence (slightly less than seven full years), approximately 240 complaints
brought under the dispute settlement system, about 53 of which have resulted in
concrete findings, as expressed in a report, either of First Level Panels, or of the
Appellate Body (a new part of the dispute settlement procedure introduced by the
Uruguay Round text). Overall, this jurisprudence constitutes somewhat more than
11,000 pages, and, in fact, is enormously rich. Yet, there are worries that the dispute
settlement system is too secretive, and lacks transparency. There are also worries
that it is not open to participation of important players, including non-governmental
entities. The ‘ government-to-government ’ approach of the dispute settlement system
is what particularly annoys some of the observers, although there are arguments to
support that characteristic of the system. Sometimes diplomats find themselves as
frustrated as national sovereigns in the parameters imposed upon them by the treaty
texts as implemented by the dispute settlement system.
However, some of the smaller countries that are Members of the WTO are finding
great comfort in the more rigorous and more rule-oriented dispute settlement
procedures that have been introduced by the Uruguay Round text. Some of the least-











































110     .       

developed countries have found some measure of success in a few cases, even against
very large and powerful trading Members."#
Furthermore, although there are a few notorious examples of non-compliance in
relation to some of the completed dispute settlement reports, on the whole there
appears to be a very good record of compliance, including compliance by some of the
most powerful nations who are utilizing the system. In addition, many of the
complaints brought are being settled or otherwise disposed, on bases that appear to
be amicable, between the disputing parties. This is a good sign that the dispute
settlement system is playing a more efficient role in providing for dispute settlement ;
particularly dispute settlement that is consistent with the overall rules.
The jurisprudence of the new system is mostly reflected by an amazing group of
reports by the Appellate Body in approximately 40 of the finished cases. The
Appellate Body has brought a sense of rigor and deep analysis that goes well beyond
the jurisprudence that developed during the more than three decades of the GATT,
and indeed, may go beyond the record of any international law tribunal known in
history. In that jurisprudence, the Appellate Body divisions are seen to struggle with
a variety of very difficult concepts about reconciling, on the one hand, the need for
allowing nation states a ‘ margin of appreciation ’ or a measure of ‘ deference ’, so that
they can go about their very difficult tasks of governing in a way that can support the
lifestyle and welfare goals of their constituents. On the other hand, the Appellate
Body is struggling with the importance of rule integrity in the WTO system. In a case
such as the Shrimp-Turtle case, one can almost visualize the furrowed brows of the
Appellate Body Members as they struggle with difficult concepts, balancing
important social policies that often pose dilemmas or trade-offs, and arriving
sometimes at language that is extraordinarily nuanced and delicate, sometimes
discussed into late hours of the evening."$
However, there are manifestations within the processes of the WTO that have
resulted in strident criticism of the dispute settlement system, some of which
criticism apparently indicates a lack of understanding of a rule-oriented system or
the processes by which a judicial-type body needs to operate."% The procedures
clearly need attention, and the final Ministerial conference of the Uruguay Round at
Marrakech, Morocco in April 1994, decreed that there should be an overall review
of the dispute settlement system within the first four years of its existence.
Unfortunately, the Members of the WTO have not been able to achieve this review.
Various countries have put forward lists of reforms that they would like to see (or
at least see discussed) and an amalgamation of such lists could easily number more
12 Appellate Body Report, US – Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear
(Costa Rica v. United States), WT}DS24}AB}R, adopted 25 February 1997.
13 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT}DS58}AB}R, adopted 6 November 1998, para 121. And United States – Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT}DS58}AB}RW, adopted
22 October 2001.
14 Appellate Body Report : EC – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
WT}DS135}AB}R, adopted on 12 March 2001.
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than 200 items. Many of these items however, are, relatively, matters of ‘ finetuning ’, yet there are some important reform issues for the dispute settlement system
that need serious attention. One of the concerns that disinterested observers can have
about the WTO is that the relative paralysis of the non-dispute settlement parts of
the organization is also inhibiting the evolution and improvements that are needed
by the dispute settlement system. There is discussion of the size and nature of the
Appellate Body, for example (Should it be constituted of full-time Members rather
than part-time ? Should it be enlarged ?). There is also discussion of whether the First
Level Panels, which are now appointed ad hoc from a variety of personnel (many of
whom are officials of Member Governments, and thus are generally not paid for their
extra services to the WTO dispute settlement system) should be reformed into a
permanent roster-type arrangement similar to that which the Appellate Body has.
In some of these struggles, one can detect a certain ambivalence about the new
dispute settlement procedures, even among the major powers, which were rather
ardent proponents of the reforms developed in the Uruguay Round, but may now be
back-tracking slightly because of some of the political troubles that specific dispute
results have had for them.
To some extent, these problems mentioned above can be discussed as parts of a
broader ‘ power struggle ’ between the dispute settlement system and its officials, on
the one hand, and the diplomat}negotiators and their efforts, on the other hand. To
the extent that the diplomatic}negotiation side of the WTO becomes increasingly
unable to perform its obligations (decisions and negotiation of new rules), there is a
strong temptation by various actors within the system to take their problems to the
dispute settlement system, and this, in turn, may be posing excessive burdens on the
dispute settlement system, in the sense of causing the dispute settlement system to
address issues and legal problems that are not particularly appropriately addressed
in a rule-applying, or judicial-type institution. Many of these issues really need to be
solved by the negotiators, as part of a rule-making process, rather than a dispute
settlement}judicial process.

4. Developing countries and the newly established Advisory Centre on WTO
Law as part of the WTO system
One of the characteristics of the activity under the dispute settlement system so far
in the WTO has been the remarkable amount of developing country participation.
Of course, developing countries are sometimes the target of complaints by developed
countries. But many developing countries have, themselves, become complainants
against other Members of the WTO, including some of the important industrialized
country Members. This participation of the developing countries in this system is, in
the opinion of many, absolutely vital to the long-term durability and effectiveness of
the WTO dispute settlement system, and, therefore, probably of the WTO itself. If
the WTO is seen to be tilted, or unbalanced with respect to an important attribute
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of Membership, namely access to the dispute settlement procedures, this undermines
the sense of fairness and, to some extent, the essential value of being a Member. The
dispute settlement system thus offers considerable opportunity for fuller participation
as Members in the WTO system, and that is already manifest by the number and
distribution of cases brought.
However, experience is showing that participation in the dispute settlement
process has some very considerable costs, costs that are not easily borne by
developing countries, and particularly the least-developed countries. There are
several dimensions to these costs. First, many of the developing countries that would
like to participate in the dispute settlement process, find that they do not have the
expertise in their government service and ministries to do effective work in
connection with the WTO dispute procedures. For a while, those procedures either
prohibited or greatly inhibited the use by nation states of private counsel, hired to
work with them on cases, and to present cases in the WTO procedures. But as of
several years ago, it appears that that hurdle has been overcome, and now it is quite
common for governments, especially smaller governments and developing country
governments who do not have ‘ in house expertise ’, to retain outside counsel to help
them. But this, too, has its costs. The fees for such help can be quite onerous for
poorer countries. The very best help, of course, can command fees commensurate to
their work with other clients, including very large corporations, large and rich
governments, etc. Thus, to obtain the benefit of these highly skilled persons, the
developing countries find they must pay significant sums. In some cases, they feel that
these sums are beyond their abilities to provide, and, yet, they feel they have rights
to affirm, and need the legal profession’s assistance.
Many nation states have already realized this phenomenon in connection with
their own internal legal systems, and have developed institutions of ‘ legal aid ’, for
providing trained lawyers ’ assistance to the poor. By analogy therefore, it has
seemed to some inspired leaders within the WTO that a similar arrangement could
be developed for the WTO dispute settlement system. And thinking along those lines
has indeed resulted in the new institution being inaugurated, namely the Advisory
Centre for WTO Law, as a center to assist developing countries. Under the rules of
this Centre, developing countries will have access to assistance from an internal,
small legal staff of the Advisory Centre, and in some cases will receive assistance to
hire other private attorneys to help them. The Advisory Centre will charge fees for
this help, but the fees will be scaled down, according to the wealth of the country
seeking aid. In some cases, for the very poorest of the countries being assisted, the
fees may actually be zero.
One of the ingenious facets of the procedures established by the new Advisory
Centre is that it combines its assistance for advocacy with a moderate mission of
training. Part of this training can be accomplished by asking an assisted country to
provide a person who will be a sort of ‘ intern ’, working with the Advisory Centre
staff on the case for his or her country, and thus receiving experience in that process.
This type of capacity-building is certainly welcome, and some people believe that the
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Advisory Centre will also engage in some other types of training activities along the
same line.
Some of the issues facing the new Advisory Centre will not be easy to handle. The
Centre will obviously need to understand some of the broader trends of the WTO
negotiating and dispute systems, so as to better serve its clients in its advocacy. This
is because the panelists or Appellate Body Members that will be responding to legal
questions, will also need to respond with a knowledge of the context of those
questions, and this necessitates an understanding of where the WTO institution
currently stands, and where it is headed.
Also, the Advisory Centre will undoubtedly be called upon to make recommendations about certain reforms, presumably focusing, or even confining, its
attention to reforms about which it has the most expertise, namely the procedures of
the dispute settlement system.
However, in carrying out its responsibilities, particularly in connection with the
broader institutional setting of the WTO and providing expertise in relation to
proposals for reforms, the Advisory Centre will necessarily need to separate its
advocacy role rather strongly from its policy preferences. It has an obligation to its
clients under professional ethics (some of which will be newly developed as part of
the procedures of the WTO) to be a vigorous advocate, and utilize strong arguments
on behalf of its clients. But it will need to consider, probably on a case-by-case basis,
the degree to which its advocacy role is consistent with expressions of policy
preferences or suggestions about reform of the dispute settlement system. Needless
to say, the Advisory Centre, in this respect, will have some delicate tasks ahead of it,
but there is every confidence that its structure, personnel, and leadership will be able
to cope with these problems and dilemmas.
Finally, let me draw this article to a close with an expression of several simple
propositions. Clearly, the dispute settlement system is very central, and extremely
important for the WTO and for the WTO’s future as an institution that helps make
world markets work. It is also clear that the strength of this WTO dispute settlement
system depends on a world perception that it is fair and even-handed. And that
perception, in turn, depends on the ability of all Members of the WTO to have
essential access to the dispute settlement process, even when they lack resources to
do so on their own basis. Thus, the Advisory Centre will play an extremely
important role in assisting the relatively new organization of the WTO to better
achieve some of its purposes and goals, which, in turn, are so vitally needed in the
type of world that is developing at a rapid pace.
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